Artway v. Atty Gen NJ by unknown
1996 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-13-1996 
Artway v. Atty Gen NJ 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996 
Recommended Citation 
"Artway v. Atty Gen NJ" (1996). 1996 Decisions. 165. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996/165 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1996 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________________ 
 
NOS. 95-5157, 95-5194 and 95-5195 
_____________________ 
 




THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; 
CHIEF OF POLICE OF WOODBRIDGE TOWNSHIP, NEW JERSEY; 
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE 
 
Attorney General of New Jersey and Superintendent 








THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; 
CHIEF OF POLICE OF WOODBRIDGE TOWNSHIP, NEW JERSEY; 
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE 
 
Chief of Police of Woodbridge Township, New Jersey 








THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; 
CHIEF OF POLICE OF WOODBRIDGE TOWNSHIP, NEW JERSEY; 
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE 
 
Alexander A. Artway, Appellant in No. 95-5195 
 
(Civ. No. 94-cv-06287) 
________________________________________ 
 
Present:  SLOVITER, Chief Judge, BECKER, STAPLETON, 
MANSMANN, GREENBERG, SCIRICA, COWEN, NYGAARD, 
ALITO, ROTH, LEWIS, McKEE, and SAROKIN, Circuit Judges, 
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SUR PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING 
WITH SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING IN BANC 
______________________________________ 
 The petitions for rehearing filed by Alexander Artway 
in No. 95-5195 and by the Attorney General of New Jersey and the 
Superintendent of the New Jersey State Police in Nos. 95-5157, 
95-5194 and 95-5195 having been submitted to the judges who 
participated in the decision of this Court and to all the other 
available circuit judges in active service, and no judge who 
concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a 
majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regular active 
service not having voted for rehearing by the court in banc, the 
petition for rehearing is DENIED.  Judges Greenberg, Nygaard, 
Alito, and Sarokin would grant rehearing.  Judge Alito's 
dissenting opinion sur denial of rehearing is attached. 




     /s/ Edward R. Becker        
            Circuit Judge 
DATED: May 13, l996 
                     
1As to panel rehearing only. 
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OPINION SUR DENIAL OF REHEARING 
 
Artway v. Attorney General of the State of New Jersey 
Nos. 95-5157, 95-5194 and 95-5195 
 
Alito, Circuit Judge:  
 
  This case should be reheard by the full court. 
Rehearing in banc is appropriate when a case "involves a question 
of exceptional importance," Fed. R. App. Pr. 35(a), and the 
constitutionality of the community notification provisions of 
Megan's Law indisputably meets this standard.  This question is 
obviously important for those, such as Alexander Artway, who may 
be subject to these requirements.  It is also of enormous 
importance to children like Megan Kanka, after whom the law was 
named, and to their parents.   
  Seven-year-old Megan Kanka disappeared near her home 
on a summer day in 1994.  She was last seen talking to a next-
door neighbor, Jesse Timmendequas.  The next day Timmendequas was 
arrested and confessed that he had lured Megan into his home by 
promising to show her a puppy.  According to his confession, he 
then raped and killed her.  Only after Timmendequas's arrest    
did Megan's parents learn that he was a multiple sex offender, 
that he had assaulted and nearly killed another young girl in 
1982, and that the other two men with whom he was sharing the 
house were also convicted sex offenders whom he had met while 
incarcerated.   
 These events and other similar offenses prompted the 
New Jersey Legislature to enact the community notification 
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provisions that are at issue in this appeal.  Similar laws 
have been enacted by other states, and related legislation has 
been passed at the federal level.  The constitutionality of the 
New Jersey provisions has been upheld by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court.  Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 662 A.2d 367 (1995).  However, 
the panel's decision in this case may well result in the 
invalidation of these provisions.  Following the panel's 
decision, the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey enjoined state officials from complying with them. The 
denial of rehearing in this case means of course that, absent 
some intervening action by the Supreme Court, the panel's 
decision will control subsequent proceedings in the district 
court and before panels of our court until another occasion for 
in banc review arises.  In the meantime, a law that was enacted 
by the New Jersey Legislature to deal with what it viewed as a 
grave and imminent threat will remain in constitutional limbo and 
may go unenforced.  I find this prospect unacceptable.   
 Whether the community notification provisions of 
Megan's Law comport with the Ex Post Facto Clause is not an easy 
question.  The panel opinion's discussion of this question is 
thoughtful and scholarly, and its effort to develop a grand 
unified theory of "punishment" under the Double Jeopardy, 
Excessive Fines, and Ex Post Facto Clauses is ambitious.  I have 
serious doubts, however, concerning critical portions of the 
panel's analysis.  I am particularly troubled by the panel's 
conclusion that a measure may constitute "punishment" if its 
"effects" or "negative repercussions -- regardless of how they 
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are justified -- are great enough."  Op. at 53, 59.  I am 
doubtful that it is possible to determine that a measure 
constitutes punishment based solely on its effects.  Moreover, I 
am convinced that the panel has misinterpreted California 
Department of Corrections v. Morales, 115 S.Ct. 1597 (1995), the 
precedent on which the panel's effects test is based.    
 Is it possible to conclude that a measure constitutes 
"punishment" based solely on its effects or "sting"?  It is 
certainly not possible to conclude that a governmental action is 
non-punitive based on its mild effects.  (Even a mild criminal 
sentence -- for example, ordering a defendant to pick up litter 
in the park on a beautiful spring day -- is unquestionably 
punishment.)  Is it nevertheless possible to determine that a 
measure constitutes "punishment" based on its harsh effects?  I 
am skeptical.  It is settled that certain governmental actions 
having severe effects are not "punishment."  For instance, 
pretrial detention, though sometimes quite harsh, is "regulatory, 
not penal."  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).  So 
is the revocation of a professional or occupational license, 
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 1898), or the termination of 
Social Security benefits.  Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 
(1960), even though the effects of these actions can be 
devastating.  It is also settled that deportation, "however 
severe its consequences," does not implicate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.  Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) 
(emphasis added).  See also, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 
1032, 1038 (1984); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) ("It is 
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well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and 
severe for the alien, is not punishment.").  In view of these 
precedents, I have grave doubts whether the panel is correct that 
a measure may be held to constitute "punishment" under the Ex 
Post Facto Clause simply because its "negative repercussions  --
regardless of how they are justified -- are great enough." 
Artway, supra, slip op. at 59.   
 Moreover, I am convinced that the panel's effects test, 
whatever else may be said in its favor, is not supported by the 
Supreme Court's decision in Morales.  I see no evidence 
whatsoever that Morales was meant to adopt the far-reaching 
proposition that a measure may be held to constitute "punishment" 
for ex post facto purposes based solely on its effects. Certainly 
the Court's opinion does not expressly embrace any such broad 
proposition, and I think the best reading of the opinion is a 
much narrower one.  
 Morales concerned a 1981 California statutory amendment 
regarding eligibility for parole hearings.  Morales had twice 
been convicted of murder, first in 1971 for killing his 
girlfriend and then in 1980 for killing and dismembering an 
elderly woman who had befriended him while he was in prison and 
who had married him after he was paroled.  115 S.Ct. at 1599-
1600.  Under the law in effect at the time of his 1980 
conviction, he would have been entitled to a parole hearing every 
year beginning in 1989.  Id. at 1600.  The 1981 amendment, 
however, permitted the Board of Prison Terms to defer hearings 
for up to three years under certain limited circumstances, viz., 
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if a prisoner had been convicted of more than one offense 
involving the taking of a life and if the Board found that it was 
not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted during the 
intervening years.  Id.  In denying Morales parole in 1989, the 
Board found that he satisfied these criteria and thus deferred 
his next hearing for three years.  Id. 
 Morales argued that the application to him of the 1981 
amendment violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, and he "relie[d] 
chiefly on a trilogy of cases holding that a legislature may not 
stiffen the `standard of punishment' applicable to crimes that 
have already been committed.  See Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 
423 . . . (1937); Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 . . . (1987); 
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 . . . (1981)."  Morales, 115 S.Ct. 
at 1601.  The Supreme Court, however, distinguished these cases 
on the ground that they involved laws that "had the purpose and 
effect of enhancing the range of available prison terms," whereas 
the amendment at issue in Morales "simply `alter[ed] the method 
to be followed in fixing a parole release date under identical 
substantive standards.'"  Id. at 1602 (citations omitted).2   
 The Court then rejected Morales' argument that "the Ex 
Post Facto Clause forbids any legislative change that has any 
                     
2The Court expressly disavowed Lindsey, Weaver, and Miller to the 
extent those decisions "suggested that enhancements to the 
measure of criminal punishment fall within the ex post facto 
prohibition because they operate to the `disadvantage' of covered 
offenders."  Id. at 1602 n.3 (citations omitted).  And the 
opinion stressed that "the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is 
not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort 
of `disadvantage,' . . . but on whether any such change alters 
the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by 
which a crime is punishable."  Id.     
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conceivable risk of affecting a prisoner's punishment."  115 
S.Ct. at 1602.  The Court noted that this argument would require 
invalidation of "any of a number of minor (and perhaps 
inevitable) mechanical changes that might produce some remote 
risk of impact on a prisoner's expected term of confinement," 
"including such innocuous adjustments as changes to the 
membership of the Board of Prison Terms, restrictions on the 
hours that prisoners may use the prison law library, reductions 
to the duration of the parole hearing, restrictions on the time 
allotted for a convicted defendant's right of allocution before a 
sentencing judge, and page limitations on a defendant's 
objections to presentence reports or on documents seeking a 
pardon from the governor."  Id. at 1603.  It was in this context 
that the Court wrote that "the question of what legislative 
adjustments `will be held to be of sufficient moment to 
transgress the constitutional prohibition' must be a matter of 
`degree.'"  Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 
269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925)).   The Court then concluded that the 
1981 California amendment created "only the most speculative and 
attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect of 
increasing the measure of punishment for covered crimes" and that 
"such conjectural effects" were "insufficient" to establish an ex 
post facto violation.  Id. 
 I do not interpret Morales as standing for the sweeping 
proposition that any measure may be held to constitute 
"punishment" under the Ex Post Facto Clause based solely on its 
effects.  Rather, I think that Morales is a narrow decision that 
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means only that when a measure does not retrospectively "change 
the sentencing range" applicable to a particular offense (115 
S.Ct. at 1602) but does make procedural or other changes that may 
indirectly affect the length of time that a prisoner may serve, 
no violation of the Ex Post Clause will be found if the 
possibility of such an indirect effect is "speculative and 
conjectural."  115 S.Ct. at 1603.  Morales does stand for the 
proposition that the "effects" of a challenged measure are 
significant within this narrow context, but I do not think that 
it is correct to read Morales as adopting a universally 
applicable effects test.  It is telling, I think, that Morales 
was not even cited in the excellent briefs filed on behalf of 
Artway and his supporting amicus, the American Civil Liberties 
Union of New Jersey.   
 The panel's effects test is especially troubling 
because it encompasses not only the direct effects of the 
community notification provisions but also what may be called 
their secondary effects, that is, the effects on released sex 
offenders of actions taken by private citizens who are in turn 
affected by community notification.  I doubt whether any 
reasonably accurate assessment of the likely secondary effects of 
community notification will be possible unless implementation of 
these provisions is permitted in New Jersey or elsewhere in a 
sufficiently large sample of cases over a sufficiently extended 
period of time.  As the panel itself seems to recognize, however, 
the constitutionality of these provisions is likely to be settled 
by the first batch of pre-enforcement challenges.  See Op. at 22 
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n.9.  At that point, it is doubtful that there will be an 
adequate empirical basis for determining what the probable long 
term effects of community notification will be.  What we are 
likely to see, I fear, are district court "findings" based on 
bits of evidence that really prove little about the likely 
effects over the long term of a program of community 
notification.  This is a most unedifying prospect.  
 For these reasons, I disagree with the court's refusal 
to rehear this case in banc.  Judge Greenberg and Judge Nygaard 
join in this opinion. 
